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The Tort of Invasion of Privacy in Ohio:
Videotape Invasion and the Negligence Standard
I. INTRODUCION
The right to privacy in the United States has as its formal roots the famous
essay by Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy.1 The
article was written in response to the actions of "yellow" journalists of the day.
The concept stated therein has continued to expand to the present day. The tort
of invasion of privacy that resulted from that article is now seen in celebrated
cases such as Vance v. Judas Priest,2 and may provide protection from
overzealous citizens using videocameras to aid police.3 A cause of action for
invasion of privacy has existed in Ohio since 1956.4 Ohio law recognizes three
forms of the tort. The first is an unreasonable invasion into another's private
affairs; the second is an unreasonable appropriation of another's personality,
name or likeness; and the third is publicity of another's private affairs in which
the public has no legitimate concern. 5 The Restatement of Torts section 652A
recognizes a fourth form known as the "false light" invasion of privacy. 6 Ohio
has yet to accept this form of the tort.7
The purpose of this Note is to describe the development of the law in Ohio
by examining the contours of the law and its possible application to recent
events. This Note also will recommend changes to remedy inconsistencies
arising in decisions. A succinct statement of the law is that an invasion of
privacy is typically characterized by an intentional act that would cause mental
pain intolerable to a reasonable person. A plaintiff may avoid the intentional
element of invasion of privacy by claiming negligent infliction of emotional
distress.8 Compensatory damages are recoverable for any mental or physical
injury caused. Punitive damages and attorney fees are recoverable if either
physical injury accompanies the mental injury or the defendant acted with
I Warren & Brandeis, 7he Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
2 Nos. 86-5844, 86-3939 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Aug. 24, 1990) (WESTLAW, Allfeds, 1990
WL 130920). This case was brought by the parents of a teenager who attempted suicide
after listening to songs by the rock band Judas Priest. It was argued that the songs invaded
the teen's privacy because they contained subliminal messages that encouraged suicide. It
was held that subliminal messages were part of the songs but that they were not intentional.
3 Beck, Video Vigilantes, NEwSwEEK, July 22, 1991, at 42, 47 (this article is a good
discussion of what can happen when individuals take what can be good for society and carry
it to extremes).
4 Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
5 Id. at 35, 133 N.E.2d at 341.
6 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
7 Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983).
8 Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
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actual malice toward the plaintiff.9 A defendant may be enjoined from further
acts if necessary. 10 Third party liability is possible if the actor is aided by
another. I I The third party, however, must either know or have reason to know
of the invasion in order to be held severally liable.12 A claim for invasion of
privacy can only be made by the one whose privacy is directly, or actually,
invaded.13 In Ohio, however, invasion of privacy is not strictly limited to
living persons. Corporations, associations and government units can all claim
tortious invasion of privacy. 14
This Note will consider each form of the tort individually and then examine
the elements common to all. In that way a concise and understandable
explanation can be achieved resulting in a clear picture of the Ohio courts' view
of the tort of invasion of privacy.
II. INTRUSION INTO PRIVATE AFFAIRS
A. Private Nature of One's Affairs
In Housh v. Peth,15 the Ohio Supreme Court recognized that every
individual has the right to live without unwanted interference. In Housh, the
plaintiff's privacy was invaded by a creditor's collection activities. 16 A
campaign of harassment by repeated telephone calls 17 was found to have
invaded what Warren and Brandeis described as the plaintiff's "right to be let
alone." 18 Additional examples of creditor activities that have been labelled
harassment are the engagement of repeated collection actions against the wrong
person, 19 and rude and abusive language during telephone calls and during in
person visits by a creditor attempting to collect a debt.20 While a creditor may
9 Columbus Finance, Inc. v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 327 N.E.2d 654 (1975).
10 Housh, 165 Ohio St. at 37, 133 N.E.2d at 342.
11 LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 134, 201 N.E.2d 533, 538
(1963).
12 Id. at 132, 201 N.E.2d at 537-38.
13 Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 (N.D. Ohio
1969) (citations omitted).
14 Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton, 23 Ohio Misc. 49, 67, 259 N.E.2d
522, 534 (1970), aft'd, 28 Ohio App. 2d 95, 274 N.E.2d 766 (1971).
15 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
16 Id. at 36, 133 N.E.2d at 341.
17 Id.
18 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 1, at 195.
19 Stephens v. Harmony Loan Corp., 37 Ohio App. 2d 23, 27-28, 306 N.E.2d 163,
166 (1973).
20 See Mills v. First Nat'l Credit Bureau, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 267, 267-68, 192 N.E.2d
511,512 (1963).
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take "reasonable action" 21 to collect the debt, activities found to be a
"campaign of harassment" 22 will support a claim for invasion of privacy.
A person's privacy is protected from other forms of intrusion such as
telephone eavesdropping,23 unreasonable visual observation, 24 physical
intrusions, 25 and unreasonable mailings,26 even if there is only one incident.
The theoretical support for the tort of invasion of privacy could appropriately
be described as protection for an individual's personal dignity.27 In the case of
telephone eavesdropping, the Franklin County Court of Appeals, in LeCrone v.
Ohio Bell Telephone Co., rejected the trial court's holding that the existence of
a telephone tap, with no evidence of intercepted communications, could support
a claim for invasion of privacy. 28 Therefore, lacking a physical intrusion or
trespass in preparing to eavesdrop, an actual interception of a communication
must occur to support a claim for invasion of privacy. 29 Visual observation
may also be an invasion of privacy if the intent of the actor is to "harass or
intimidate." 30 Legitimate surveillance or observation is tolerated, however.
Legitimate surveillance allowed by Ohio courts can extend to the use of
binoculars, a telescope and a camera, and even as far as placing a platform in a
tree to acquire a better view.31
Physical intrusion is another basis for a claim of invasion of privacy. The
physical invasion associated with installing telephone eavesdropping equipment
is seen in LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co.32 Installing telephone equipment
without another's knowledge may be an invasion of privacy; similarly,
removing something from another's home also may be an invasion of
privacy. 33 In the case of physical intrusion, a single event may be sufficient for
21 Housh1, 165 Ohio St. at 40, 133 N.E.2d at 344.
22 Id. at 41, 133 N.E.2d at 344.
23 LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 133-34, 201 N.E.2d 533, 538
(1963).
24 Sustin v. Fee, 69 Ohio St. 2d 143, 146, 431 N.E.2d 992, 994 (1982); Blevins v.
Sorrell, No. CA89-10-060 (Warren County Ct. App. July 23, 1990) (WESTLAW, 1990
WL 102360).
25 LeCrone, 120 Ohio App. at 133-34, 201 N.E.2d at 538. The physical aspect of this
case was the installation of a second telephone line used for eavesdropping.
26 McCormick v. Haley, 37 Ohio App. 2d 73, 77-78, 307 N.E.2d 34, 37-38 (1973).
27 Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Personal Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39
N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).28 LeCrone, 120 Ohio App. at 133-34, 201 N.E.2d at 537-38.
29 Id.
30 Sustin v. Fee, 69 Ohio St. 2d 143, 144, 431 N.E.2d 992, 993 (1982).
31 Id. at 146, 431 N.E.2d at 994; Blevins v. Sorrell, No. CA89-10-060 (Warren
County Ct. App. July 23, 1990) (WESTLAW 1990 WL 102360) at 3.
32 120 Ohio App. at 129, 201 N.E.2d at 533.
33 Matthews v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., C.A. No. E-82-8, C.P. No. 43709 (Erie County
Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1982) (WESTLAW 1982 WL 6592).
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the plaintiff to recover for invasion of privacy.34 For example, if a mailing is
"designed to harass and torment . . . a single act . . . can constitute an
actionable invasion of the right to privacy when it is accomplished in such a
manner as to outrage or cause mental suffering." 35
The right to be free from unreasonable intrusion therefore protects persons
in various aspects of life. Those protected aspects exhibited in Ohio cases
include, (1) freedom from personal or telephone harassment; (2) security in
one's personal communications; (3) security in one's home or personal place
from physical intrusions; (4) freedom from unreasonable observation or
surveillance; and (5) freedom from shocking or outrageous written
communication.
B. Outrageous Nature of the Act
The Ohio Supreme Court in Housh36 explained that if conduct was such
"as to outrage or cause mental suffering, shame or humiliation to a person of
ordinary sensibilities" the plaintiff is entitled to recover damages. 37 The
standard in privacy cases is the "person of ordinary sensibilities." 38 However,
there are examples in which a defendant, in this writer's opinion, has gone well
beyond behavior expected in modem society, and yet no recovery for invasion
of privacy was allowed. 39 Neither Ohio privacy cases nor the Restatement4°
support the proposition that a plaintiff claiming invasion of privacy may
recover damages caused by a peculiarity that the plaintiff possesses. However,
the Restatement's description of the tort of infliction of emotional distress,
emotional distress also being an element of invasion of privacy, does recognize
this possibility. 41 The Ohio common law of infliction of emotional distress has
been interpreted to allow recovery by a plaintiff who possesses a peculiarity if
34 Id.; McCormick v. Haley, 37 Ohio App. 2d 73, 307 N.E.2d 34, 35 (1973).
35 McConick, 37 Ohio App. 2d at 78, 307 N.E.2d at 38.
36 Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
37 Id. at 39-40, 133 N.E.2d at 343.381Id.
39 See Reamsnyder v. Jaskolski, 10 Ohio St. 3d 150, 462 N.E.2d 392 (1984); Hailer
v. Phillips, No. 90AP-512 (Franklin County Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1990) (WESTLAW 1990
WL 140553). These two cases are good examples of the type of behavior that can lead to a
suit for invasion of privacy. In Reansnyder, the defendant told the plaintiff over the phone
that he was going to tear the plaintiff's face off. In Hailer, the defendant merely called the
plaintiff a son of a bitch and asked the plaintiff's wife if the son of a bitch was home.
40 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977). This section speaks only in
terms of "reasonable persons." A "special plaintiff" is not considered, and therefore not
covered, by the section.
41 Id. at § 46 comment f. "The extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may
arise from the actor's knowledge that the other is peculiarly susceptible to emotional
distress, by reason of some physical or mental condition or peculiarity."
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the defendant is aware of the plaintiff's condition.42 This standard is not
applied to invasion of privacy cases at the present time.43 In the interest of
consistency it may be argued that the tort of invasion of privacy should
consider any special attributes of the plaintiff. There is no reason to allow
recovery for a "special plaintiff" based under one theory, infliction of
emotional distress, and deny recovery under another, invasion of privacy, when
both torts are based on the same type of injury.
The Hamilton County Court of Appeals has interpreted Housh to allow
recovery for negligent invasion of privacy.44 Although Prince v. St. Francis-St.
George Hospital Inc.45 has not been followed by other courts, this author
believes it to be important for two reasons. First, the court acknowledged
recovery for negligent invasion of privacy. Second, the defendant in Prince
disclosed to the plaintiff's employer that the plaintiff had received treatment for
alcoholism. It is reasonable to assume that a court may apply the same standard
in other settings such as drug treatment or positive HIV tests. Additionally,
Ohio recognizes a cause of action for negligent infliction of serious emotional
distress. 46 Because both torts look to mental injury as the source of damages,
an inconsistency in the law is created. 47 Similar to the "special" plaintiff who
can recover by claiming infliction of mental distress but not by using invasion
of privacy, a plaintiff claiming negligence may recover damages for infliction
of emotional distress, but not invasion of privacy. Since Ohio courts have
begun to allow recovery for negligence-based infliction of emotional distress,
there is no reason not to allow negligence-based invasion of privacy, especially
because both are based on the same type of injury. Therefore, this author
believes that Ohio courts should allow recovery for negligently caused invasion
of privacy. This approach could provide a great deal of protection for persons
who are doing acts in what they believe to be a private place, even if in reality
they are not.48
Accordingly, until the Ohio Supreme Court expressly holds otherwise, a
plaintiff should be able to recover for negligent invasion of privacy, provided
the elements of both negligence and invasion of privacy are met. At the present
time, however, the Ohio Supreme Court has not conclusively decided the issues
of "special" plaintiffs and negligence-based claims. Therefore, in spite of the
unusually aggressive stance the Ohio courts have taken towards mental
42 Reamsnyder, 10 Ohio St. 3d at 155, 462 N.E.2d at 396.
43 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977); see supra note 40.
44 Prince v. St. Francis-St. George Hosp. Inc., 20 Ohio App. 3d 4, 7, 484 N.E.2d
265, 269 (1985).
45 20 Ohio App. 3d 4, 484 N.E.2d 265 (1985).
46 Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
47 Id.; Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
48 Cf. Reamsnyder v. Jaskolski, 10 Ohio St. 3d 150, 462 N.E.2d 392 (1984); Schultz,
4 Ohio St. 3d at 131, 447 N.E.2d at 110.
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injury,49 a person may choose to live any way he wishes, but recovery for
intrusion into his life will most likely be judged on the basis of whether the
intrusion is intentional and would outrage "a person of ordinary
sensibilities. "50
Ii. APPROPRIATION OF ANOTHER'S NAME OR LIKENESS
A. Introduction
The second recognized form of invasion of privacy in Ohio is the
"unwarranted appropriation or exploitation of one's personality." 51 The
Restatement uses the language "name or likeness" instead of personality.5 2 The
difference in terminology manifests itself in the types of appropriations that will
support recovery. The essence of the tort is the use of some identifying feature
of another, without the other's consent, and in such a way as to outrage a
person of ordinary sensibilities, in an attempt to benefit from such unauthorized
use.
B. Nature of the Interest Protected
Ohio law does not limit the tort of invasion of privacy by appropriation of
another's personality solely to cases of appropriation for financial or
commercial use. The objective of Ohio law is the protection of "each
individual['s] . . . exclusive use of his own identity." 53 This view reflects the
Restatement's position on this topic.54
This conceptual basis manifests itself in the determination of damages. A
plaintiff's damages are calculated on the injury to themselves, not on the unjust
49 See Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109
(1983) and Paugh v. Hambs, 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 451 N.E.2d 759 (1983), and their
progeny. In 1983 the Ohio Supreme Court allowed recovery for negligent infliction
of emotional distress in Schultz and further explained the standards and factors
which are applicable in Paugh.
50 Housh, 165 Ohio St. at 39-40, 133 N.E.2d at 343.
51 Id. at 35, 133 N.E.2d at 341.
52 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (1977). "One who appropriates to his
own use ... the name or likeness of another is subject to liability to the other for invasion
of his privacy."
53 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 229, 351
N.E.2d 454, 458 (1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562 (1977). While reversed, the case contains an
excellent discussion of the law and the interest protected.
54 REsrATEmENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comment b (1977).
1604 [Vol. 52:1599
TORT OF INVASION OF PRIVACY
enrichment or benefit obtained by a defendant. 55 This view can create
anomalous results when comparing private persons to public persons. For
example, a public person that has invested heavily in her personality may
recover a correspondingly large award. At the same time, a private person may
suffer the same amount, but recovery will be less by virtue of the fact that there
was no investment in her personality. Some states have codified the tort of
invasion by appropriation. In New York, the tort is limited to recovery from
defendants that have benefitted financially or commercially from the
appropriation. 56 This approach effectively removes the private-public person
distinction, because it is unlikely that someone would appropriate another's
name or likeness for commercial use if that person's name or likeness had no
public or commercial value. While it may be argued that this is the wiser
approach, private persons are left relatively unprotected from unwarranted
appropriations of their names or likenesses.
The interest protected by the invasion of privacy by appropriation has been
described differently by various commentators. The difficulty appears to arise
from the seemingly different interests a person has in presenting her personality
or distinguishing characteristics to the public. A public figure depends on
exposing (or licensing for exposure) her personality in order to profit from that
personality. 57 Most individuals, however, prefer not to be exposed at all to the
public at large, or to have their identifying characteristics used by anyone else.
Dean Prosser views it as "proprietary,"58 while Professor Bloustein prefers to
unify all forms under a "human dignity" theory. 59 Professor Hyman Gross
argues that both Prosser's and Bloustein's theories are in error. 60 This
philosophic difference can manifest itself in the protection afforded differently
situated plaintiffs as discussed in the prior paragraph.
Appropriation of a private person's identifying characteristics would seem
to cause the required "outrage. . .mental suffering, shame or humiliation," 61
when appropriation of a public person's identifying characteristics may not.
While the differences between public and private persons are real, the interest
protected can be unified under a theory of protecting the control of exposure of
one's identifying characteristics. This would be the most logical way to identify
the tort and to arrive at damages based on the injury to the individual plaintiff.
55 Schlessman v. Schlessman, 50 Ohio App. 2d 179, 182, 361 N.E.2d 1347, 1349
(1975). The defendant in this case signed the plaintiff's name to a tax return against the
plaintiff's wishes.
56 See, e.g., N.Y. Cirv. RIGHTS LAW § 50 (Consol. 1989).
57 See Zacchzini, 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 351 N.E.2d 454 (1976), rev'd, 433 U.S. 562
(1977).
58 Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALII. L. REV. 383, 406 (1960).
59 Bloustein, supra note 27, at 962.6 0 Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 34, 46-54 (1967).
61 Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340, 341 (1956).
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In this way, a public person can be compensated for an unauthorized
appropriation of their identifying characteristics similarly to a private person.
The major difference is the type of injury. A public person's damages are most
likely to be lost revenues or the cost of the investment in his talent.62 A private
person's damages are most likely to be found in mental injury or "injury to his
feelings." 63
C. Incidental Use of Another's Personality
While an unconsented appropriation of another's personality is not
permitted, the use must be more than merely incidental. 64 The line between
incidental use and appropriation is not a bright line. As Vinci v. American Can
Co. 65 demonstrates, informational use of a person's personality without any
intent to take advantage of that use is allowed by Ohio courts. 66
The argument for appropriation to apply in situations similar to Vinci is
that the presentation of the plaintiff on a product package or in an article tends
to create an association between the product and the individual in the
consumer's mind. In this way the defendant indirectly capitalizes on another's
name or likeness. The courts presently do not agree with this position. The
movement, however, toward allowing negligence-based claims in other forms
of invasion of privacy may result in a relaxation of the "incidental use" bar to a
claim of invasion of privacy by unwarranted appropriation. If a plaintiff can
prove that he was harmed by the defendant's use of his personality and the
defendant acted negligently toward the plaintiff, recovery may be possible.
Although no case has been decided on this point, the allowance of invasion of
privacy by appropriation is a logical extension of the movement identified in
prior sections of this Note.67
D. Appropriation by News Reporting Services
News publishing and broadcasting present special problems regarding first
amendment rights of the press. The Supreme Court has held that the first and
fourteenth amendments do not provide a blanket privilege to the press for
62 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 576 (1976).
63 Schlessman v. Schlessman, 50 Ohio App. 2d 179, 181-82, 361 N.E.2d 1347, 1349
(1975).
6 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C comment d (1977); Zacchini v.
Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 229, 351 N.E.2d 454, 458 (1976).
65 No. 58857 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. Sept. 27, 1990) (WESTLAW 1990 WL
139739).
66 Id., (WESTLAW 1990 WL 139739) at 2.
67 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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reporting a public event. 68 The press may report a. newsworthy event, but a
person's identity still may not be appropriated for the media's use.69
There is some dispute over the definition of newsworthy, 70 and no
expression of the meaning of newsworthy is found in Ohio cases. Therefore,
this point will continue to cause difficulties and needs to be resolved. This
author believes the standard should be that information reported should be "a
meritorious contribution"71 and not simply one of "widespread public
interest." 72 A "meritorious contribution" may be described as information
designed to "inform" or "educate," while a matter of "widespread public
interest" would only "entertain or amuse. "73 This standard affords individuals
more protection in a society in which considerable information is accessible and
considered "newsworthy" by some members of the media.
The tort of invasion of privacy by intentionally appropriating another's
identifying characteristics is complicated by the factors discussed above: news
media and incidental use. However, as with the other form of invasion of
privacy, the act must be outrageous or cause mental suffering to a person of
ordinary sensibilities before a plaintiff can recover damages. 74
IV. PUBLICITY OF PRIVATE AFFAIRS
A. Introduction
The Supreme Court of Ohio also has recognized in Housh the form of the
tort when the actor has "publiciz[ed] ... one's private affairs ... with which
the public has no legitimate concern." 75 It must be understood that "[p]ublicity
here means communicating the matter to the public at large"76 and not
publication in the legal sense-a communication to at least one other person.
Even publicity to a moderately large group, thirty to fifty people, often will not
support a claim of unreasonable publicity. 77 The Restatement, which Ohio
68 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1976).
69 See id.
70 Comment, The Right to Privacy: Nonmative-Desctiptive Conflion in the Defense of
Newsworthiness, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 722 (1963).
71 Id. at 725.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 727.
74 Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 39, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1956).
75 Id. at 35, 133 N.E.2d at 340.
76 Killilea v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 27 Ohio App. 3d 163, 166, 499 N.E.2d 1291,
1294 (1985).
77 Adams v. St. Elizabeth Hosp. Med. Center, No. 87-CA-180 (Mahoning County Ct.
App. Mar. 16, 1989) (WESTLAW 1989 WL 25561).
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courts generally follow in this regard, 78 describes the requirements of the
matter communicated as "highly offensive to a reasonable person" and "not of
legitimate concern to the public." 79
B. Private Nature of the Matter Publicized
The privacy tort of unreasonable publicity has an important limiting factor:
the matter must be truly of a private nature. "[M]atters of public record
about... birth or marriage date, or matters that the plaintiff leaves open to the
public eye" do not give rise to liability if more publicity is given to them by
another. 80 Examples of this view are the incidental videotaping of a plaintiff by
a news reporter during a drug raid, 81 videotaping by a news reporter of a crime
suspect in an open hallway at a sheriff's department building, 82 or printing the
name and address of a crime suspect's parents.8 3 This position is also
supported by the Restatement, which states: "There is no liability when the
defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff that
is already public." 84 There is little disagreement found in Ohio cases
concerning this limitation.
Ohio has departed from the Restatement view concerning who is protected
from unreasonable publicity. The Restatement speaks in terms of individuals. It
does not generally recognize a claim for invasion of privacy by a legal entity. 85
The proposition that "[tihe right to privacy applies to individuals, corporations,
associations, institutions and to public officials" is found in Dayton
Newspapers, Inc. v. City of Dayton.86 In that case a demand for entry into all
government meetings was rejected on the theory that public entities require
some degree of privacy. The court held that in the case of government units the
"legislat[ure] or sovereign power" sets the amount of publicity about internal
matters. 87
An unanswered question on this topic is whether a legal entity could
recover damages as well as prevent access to private matters. However, the
City of Dayton did not claim that its privacy had been invaded in order to
78 See Killilea, 27 Ohio App. 3d at 166-67, 499 N.E.2d at 1294-95; Penwell v. Taft
Broadcasting Co., 13 Ohio App. 3d 382, 384, 469 N.E.2d 1025, 1028 (1984).
79 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (9)(a)-(b) (1977).
80 Killilea, 27 Ohio App. 3d at 166-67, 499 N.E.2d at 1295.
81 Penwell, 13 Ohio App. 3d 382, 469 N.E.2d 1025 (1984).
82 Haynik v. Zimlich, 30 Ohio Misc. 2d 16, 498 N.E.2d 1095 (1986).
83 Strutner v. Dispatch Printing Co., 2 Ohio App. 3d 377, 442 N.E.2d 129 (1982).
8 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comment b (1977).
85 Id. at § 6521, "Except for appropriation. . . an action for invasion of privacy can be
maintained only by a living individual .... "
86 23 Ohio Misc. 49, 67, 259 N.E.2d 522, 534 (1970), aff'd, 28 Ohio App. 2d 95, 274
N.E.2d 766 (1971).
87 Id. at 67-72, 259 N.E.2d at 534-37.
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recover damages. The city used privacy as a defense against a declaratory
judgment action brought in an attempt to force all meetings to be open to the
public. 88 It is doubtful that a legal entity could recover damages because the
tort of invasion of privacy is personal to the plaintiff, and therefore, damages
would be extremely difficult to prove.8 9 Injury to employees or officials cannot
be used. 90 A separate claim specific to that person must be brought. This writer
has been unable to identify a method of proof, and so the remedy for a legal
entity may be limited to enjoining future acts.
C. Outrageous Nature of the Publicity
The publicity must also be "outrage[ous] or cause mental suffering" or be
highly offensive.91 Although this form of invasion of privacy is recognized in
Housh, examples of acts fulfilling this element of the tort are not found in later
Ohio cases. Decisions in the preceding paragraphs of this section were based
on the public nature of the matter publicized and not on the outrageousness or
the mental suffering caused. The Franklin County Court of Appeals has stated
that a plaintiff may be able to prove invasion of privacy on the facts of Killilea
v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.92 The plaintiff here was being detained by a store
employee. She claimed humiliation caused by being "'paraded'... through the
store . . . [and being] continually subjected to great public awareness of her
detainment." 93 The connection between the torts of invasion of privacy and
infliction of emotional distress is so close that they are often pleaded together.94
The case may then be decided on a mental suffering theory as opposed to a
theory of unreasonable publicity given to private matters. An application of the
mental suffering theory results in a lower negligence standard. 95
D. Effect of Time on Unreasonable Publicity
An issue complicating the publicity tort is the time element. A person who
is a public figure is entitled to less privacy than a private figure;96 however, the
88 Id.
89 Young v. That Was The Week That Was, 312 F. Supp. 1337, 1340 (N.D. Ohio
1969) (citations omitted).
90 See Allen, Rethinking the Rule Against Corporate Privacy Rights: Some Conceptual
Quandries/[sic], 20 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 607, 610-11 (1987).
91 Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340, 341; RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 652D(a) (1977).
92 27 Ohio App. 3d 163, 499 N.E.2d 1291 (1985).
93 Id. at 164, 499 N.E.2d at 1292.
94 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
95 Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
96 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D comments e, f (1977).
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passing of time may cause a public figure to recede into the general public and
then be entitled to the greater privacy afforded a private person. 97 There are
well-known cases, however, allowing publicity about a former public figure
long after he had receded from the public view.98 It appears that cases must be
decided on their facts as to whether the plaintiff is entitled to a higher degree of
privacy.
While Ohio courts recognize this third form of the tort, no cases have been
found that were successful. The requirements that (1) the matter be truly
private; (2) it be publicized to the public at large; and (3) the publicity cause
outrage or mental suffering, have not been met by the available cases. It is
difficult to determine whether Ohio courts are especially conservative on this
point or whether plaintiffs are bringing frivolous suits. Upon consideration of
the cases examined in this section of the Note, it appears the answer is that
plaintiffs are overly sensitive to the circumstances. Therefore, while an
invasion of privacy can be claimed for unreasonable publicity given to private
matters, actual cases are more likely to be successful by claiming infliction of
emotional distress rather than invasion of privacy.
V. PLACING ANOTHER IN A FALSE LIGHT
A. Introduction
Ohio has neither accepted nor rejected the privacy tort of publicizing
misleading information about another person. This form of invasion of privacy
has also been described as placing another in a "false light." 99 The Ohio
Supreme Court has stated that there is "no rationale which compels us to adopt
the 'false light' theory of recovery in Ohio at this time," 1°° thus leaving the
door open to a fact pattern that may support a claim for false light invasion of
privacy.' 01 The Restatement describes the tort of false light invasion of privacy
97 Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931). This is one of the most
famous cases concerning publicity given to a former public figure. The plaintiff was a
prostitute who had been prosecuted, and acquitted for murder in 1918. She then married
and became associated with persons who did not know of her past. In 1925 her past was
exposed when the defendants made and distributed a movie based upon her experiences.
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff could sue for invasion of
privacy.
98 Sidis v. F-R Publishing Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940).
99 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
100 Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 372, 453 N.E.2d 666,
670 (1983); Celebrezze v. Dayton Newspapers, Inc., 41 Ohio App. 3d 343, 344-45, 535
N.E.2d 755, 757 (1988).
101 Although "false light" remains a possibility, the Ohio Supreme Court's view can be
found in Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Local Lodge 1297 v. Allen, 22 Ohio St. 3d
228, 234, 490 N.E.2d 865, 870-71 (1980). "Appellees urge several legal theories but each
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as liability caused by: (1) placing another in a false light that "would be highly
offensive to a reasonable person; and (2) acting with the "knowledge of or...
in reckless disregard as to the falsity of the publicized matter and the false light
in which the other would be placed." 102
B. Rejection of False Light
At this point in time it is unknown what fact pattern would be sufficient for
the Ohio Supreme Court to allow recovery on a claim for placing another in a
false light. Examples of facts not supporting a claim can be found in the leading
case in Ohio, Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters.10 3 The plaintiff here was
described on printed handbills and picket signs during a labor dispute as a
"Little Hitler" who used "Gestapo tactics." The court based its decision in part
on the fact that the communication "constitut[ed] expressions of opinions, not
facts. 1 0 4 Another well-known case is based on a published political cartoon
concerning the plaintiff.' 05 The court applied the same reasoning in holding
that the facts present did not compel recovery based on a false light theory. 10 6
There is one lower court case in which a prima facie case for false light
invasion of privacy was made. In Filotei v. Booth Broadcasting Co., 107 the
Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals specifically required that the act be
intentional; however, this may not be the case at present given the trend
discussed earlier.1 08 However, Filotei did not go to the Ohio Supreme Court
and has not been followed by other courts. Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has
examined Ohio law since both Filotei0 9 and Yeager, 0 and held that until the
Ohio Supreme Court affirmatively accepts the false light invasion of privacy
theory, no recovery may be allowed. 111
seeks to remedy the single alleged wrong of communication by appellants to third parties of
appellants' low opinion of appellees or, in a word defamation." The appellees here were
called "scabs" during a labor dispute.
102 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977) (emphasis added).
103 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983).
104 Id. at 372, 453 N.E.2d at 670; see also Celebrezze, 41 Ohio App. 3d at 347, 535
N.E.2d at 759.
105 Celebrezze, 41 Ohio App. 3d 343, 535 N.E.2d 755 (1988).
106 Id. at 344-45, 535 N.E.2d at 756-58. The court used the rationale that the cartoon
consisted of "opinion," not fact.
107 No. 43454 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1981) (WESTLAW 1981 WL
4676) at 3. It must be noted that this is a pre-Yeager case.
108 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
109 No. 43454 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1981) (WESTLAW 1981 WL
4676).
110 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983).
111 Angelotta v. American Broadcasting Corp., 820 F.2d 806, 807-08 (6th Cir. 1987).
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C. The Effect of Statute of Limitations
Ohio courts could have allowed recovery for false light invasion of
privacy. For example, the statute of limitations for libel and slander is one
year, while the statute of limitations on the tort of invasion of privacy is four
years.1 2 It could be argued that a claim for defamation that is time barred may
be thought to be a compelling reason to allow a claim for invasion of privacy
that is not time barred. It has been held that the privacy tort does not merge
with defamation." 3 However, the Sixth Circuit, interpreting Ohio law, has
held that when multiple claims are based upon the same facts, "the Ohio
Supreme Court would apply the one-year statute of limitations period
applicable to . . . defamation." 1 4 Therefore, the privacy tort of false light
would not survive beyond the defamation cause of action if based upon the
same facts.
The tort of placing another in a false light by publicizing private matters
has not been expressly accepted or rejected by the Ohio Supreme Court. The
court's policy of following the Restatement may be helpful in predicting the
required proof if Ohio does recognize false light invasion of privacy in future
cases.' 15 At present, however, the Ohio Supreme Court has implicitly rejected




The rule on damages recoverable in invasion of privacy actions is found in
Housh v. Peth1 8 and more recently in Columbus Finance, Inc. v. Howard.119
If a defendant is found to have invaded the privacy of another in any of the
accepted forms described above, she will be liable for compensatory damages
for any mental suffering 120 and any physical injury, or "that amount of money
that will compensate and make whole the injured party." 12 1 The limitation on
112 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2305.09, 2305.11 (Baldwin 1990).
113 Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, 64 Ohio Misc. 59, 413 N.E.2d 860 (1978).
114 Lusby v. Cincinnati Monthly Publishing Corp., No. 89-3854, slip op. (6th Cir.
June 6, 1990) (904 F.2d 707 table) (WESTLAW database CTA6).
115 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E (1977).
116 Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983).
117 Lusby, No. 89-3854 (June 6, 1990) (WESTLAW database CTA6).
118 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
119 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 327 N.E.2d 654 (1975).
120 Housh, 165 Ohio St. at 40, 133 N.E.2d at 344.
121 Columbus Finance, 42 Ohio St. 2d at 184, 327 N.E.2d at 658 (citation omitted).
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damages is found in the level of injury required. Housh states that damages are
allowed that "result from mental anguish." 122 A good description of the
severity of injury required is found in Paugh v. Hanks.123 Injury must be "both
severe and debilitating" such as "neurosis, psychosis, chronic depression or
phobia." 124 Although this is a heavy burden, it does prevent frivolous suits
when a person's feelings are hurt or when a person is seriously insulted.
B. Punitive Damages
There is some dispute over the issue of punitive damages. Punitive
damages will only be awarded if the actor is proven to have actual malice, as
defined by the Ohio Supreme Court in Colwnbus Finance,125 or the mental
injury is accompanied by contemporaneous physical injury. The court in
Columbus Finance states that actual malice is "that state of mind under which a
person's conduct is characterized by hatred or ill will, a spirit of revenge,
retaliation, or a determination to vent his feelings upon the other persons." 12 6
Legal malice "infer[red] from or impute[d] to certain acts" 12 7 will not support
a claim for punitive damages. However, there is some movement toward
allowing punitive damages when actual malice is not present. For example, the
Erie County Court of Appeals has allowed punitive damages with no
contemporaneous physical injury and no actual malice proven.128 The court
allowed punitive damages in this instance because of the "outrageous invasion
of the righti] to privacy and . . [the right] to be secure in one's home...
[when] such an egregious violation . . . would be tantamount to encouraging
violence." 129 The holding in Columbus Finance has not been overruled.
Therefore, the prevailing view in Ohio courts notwithstanding the movement
toward allowing punitive damages when no actual malice is proven, or no
contemporaneous physical injury is manifested, comports with the requirements
discussed previously in Colwnbus Finance. 130
122 Housh1, 165 Ohio St. at 40, 133 N.E.2d at 344.
123 6 Ohio St. 3d 72, 78, 451 N.E.2d 759, 765 (1983).124 Id. at 78, 451 N.E.2d at 765.
125 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 327 N.E.2d 654 (1975).
126 Id. at 183-84, 327 N.E.2d at 658 (citations omitted).
127 Columbus Finance, Inc. v. Howard, 38 Ohio App. 2d 7, 11-12, 311 N.E.2d 32,
35 (1973), affd in part, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 327 N.E.2d 654 (1975).
128 Matthews v. Ohio Bell Tel. Co., C.A. No. E-82-8, C.P. No. 43709 (Erie County
Ct. App. Oct. 15, 1982) (WESTLAW 1982 WL 6592).
129 Id. at 10. The defendant's employee entered the plaintiff's home while she was
away and he removed telephones from her kitchen and bedroom. The plaintiff did not
discover the intrusion until she returned home and discovered her telephones had been
taken.
130 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
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VII. CONCLUSION
Ohio has allowed recovery for the tort of invasion of privacy since
1956.131 At present only three of the four forms of the tort identified by Dean
Prosser132 and the Restatement133 have been accepted in Ohio. The accepted
forms include: (1) intrusion into private affairs; (2) appropriation of another's
name or likeness; and (3) publicity given to another's private affairs, which has
yet to be successfully sued upon in Ohio. 134 The fourth form, placing another
in a false light, has not been accepted by the Ohio Supreme Court at the present
time. 135
The courts in Ohio have been conservative in allowing recovery for the tort
of invasion of privacy, following the Restatement closely in almost every
aspect. The one area in which Ohio has been aggressive is in considering
recovery for negligence-based claims. This is basically a mirroring of the
recognition of negligent infliction of emotional distress. 136 Given the
difficulties encountered in proving intent to invade another's privacy this is a
great aid to plaintiffs. This aspect may offer persons some protection from
videotaping or intrusions similar to that found in Judas Priest. 137 However, the
Ohio Supreme Court has not yet ruled on the question.
The unifying features of these cases are: (1) something truly private to the
plaintiff must have been invaded; (2) the invasion typically must intend to
outrage or cause mental suffering; (3) the invasion must be outrageous or cause
mental suffering intolerable to a person of ordinary sensibilities; and (4) it must
in fact be the plaintiff's privacy that was invaded.
As difficult as it may be to criticize a court that follows the Restatement so
closely, there are areas in which Ohio courts could provide more direction or
consistency in the law of invasion of privacy. The first is a clear expression of
the standard applicable to a defendant's action. The Ohio Supreme Court needs
to decide whether a person's privacy can be invaded negligently, or whether
negligence is limited exclusively to infliction of emotional distress in the field
of mental injury torts. Secondly, regarding false light invasion of privacy, if
there are no facts that would compel the Ohio Supreme Court to accept this
form of the tort, this must be stated. This author tends to believe that this is the
case, but the court is hesitant to reject what the Restatement and Dean Prosser
have seen fit to accept.
131 Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 133 N.E.2d 340 (1956).
132 Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 (1960).
133 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652 (1977).
134 See generally, Housh, 165 Ohio St. at 35, 133 N.E.2d at 341.
135 Yeager v. Local Union 20, Teamsters, 6 Ohio St. 3d 369, 453 N.E.2d 666 (1983).
136 Schultz v. Barberton Glass Co., 4 Ohio St. 3d 131, 447 N.E.2d 109 (1983).
137 See supra note 2.
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Injured parties should be less concerned with tailoring their claims to fit the
established forms of a cause of action than with being compensated for injury.
If the court were to take action on those two points the author believes the law
would be simplified and injured plaintiffs would be better able to recover when
they are harmed.
Anthony J. DeGirolano

